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Foreclosures
D
ESPITEthe leniency of the Home Owners'. Loan Corporation
and its efforts to adjust payment requirements to the borrower's
needs, it acquired through foreclosure (or obtained through volun-
tary transfer of title by deed) the properties securing about one out
of every five of its original loans; furthermore, around one out of
fifty of the loans which it made when selling foreclosed properties (so-
called "vendee loans") ended with foreclosure.' This record differs
oniy slightly from that for a sample of urban mortgage loans made
by twenty-four leading life insurance companies on one- to four-
family dwellings during the years 1920-46, the life insurance com-
pany foreclosure rate for the entire period being 7.9 percent. For
the years 1930-34, the life insurance company foreclosure rate was
17.4 percent; and for loans made during the five-year period 1925-29,
it was 20.9 percent. However, the foreclosure rate on the relatively
few loans made by these companies while the HOLC was making its
original loans—from 1933 through 1936—was 2.6 percent.2 Loans
made by these companies during the years 1938-40 were foreclosed at
about the same rate as HOLC loans made during the same period to
finance the sale of properties it acquired by foreclosure.
While the handling of foreclosures proved troublçsome and
costly, the original HOLC Act made no reference to this problem
and nothing was said concerning it in the Congressional debates, in-
terest being focused then primarily on the extension of aid. Yet the
necessity of foreclosure was implicit in the terms of the Corporation's
1Fromthe viewpoint of the study of "investment experience," foreclosures may be
merged with voluntary transfers of title by deed; consequently, to simplify the presenta-
tion of this chapter, the term "foreclosure" includes—unless specifically indicated other-
wise—cases in which properties were acquired through voluntary transfers as well as
those cases in which properties were acquired through foreclosure proceedings.
2R.J. Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, 1950) Table 22, p. 84. The
data are for a sample of urban mortgage loans made on one- to four-family dwellings by
twenty-four leading life insurance companies, 1920-46. Loans transferred to the HOLC
by these insurance companies are not classed as foreclosed.
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creation, since the security it took was the mortgage, ultimately en-
forceable only in this manner. In any event, Congress could not at the
time have known clearly what kind of foreclosure policy it wished
the HOLC to follow.
Delinquencies arose shortly after lending operations started,
and, in the end, nearly 200,000 properties were acquired—about 18
percent by voluntary transfer of deed and the remainder by fore-
closure. The servicing facilities discussed in Chapter 5 were designed
to prevent foreclosure, and doubtless succeeded in a great many cases,
but it became apparent early that some delinquencies were the de-
liberate actions of individuals who sought to take advantage of the
government. Then, the HOLC, with the support of the President,
moved quickly to protect its interests. It was publicly stated that fore-
closures would be pressed—and they were in numerous cases—with
the result that many borrowers were stimulated to make their best
financial effort.
TIMING OF FORECLOSURES3
By the time the lending had stopped in June 1936, the HOLC had
acquired 5,275 houses on which its claims totaled $24 million—
roughly 0.6 percent of the numberof loans outstanding a year or
more and 0.7 percent of the loans outstanding eighteen months or
more.4 In addition, 2,391 properties with a capitalized value of about
$12 million were in process of acquisition, and foreclosure had been
authorized in more than 20,000 other cases. Foreclosures rose rap-
idly from less than 1,500 a month in June 1936 to well over 4,500 a
month a year later. Throughout the next twelve months, the rate
averaged about 4,500 per month, except for March 1938 when fore-
3 For some purposes, the date of authorization of foreclosure is more significant than
the date of actual HOLC title acquisition. However, authorization wasnotalways fol-
lowed by foreclosure. Also, HOLC foreclosure action had to take account of the
differences in state law, which make the data noncomparable in many important re-
spects. In view of these qualifications, therefore, data on properties acquired are used in
this study to analyze foreclosure experience.
4 It may be of interest to note that the number of loans foreclosed by all Massa-
chusetts mutual savings banks rose sharply during the HOLC lending period (1933-36),
reaching a peak in 1935 when the number of new foreclosures totaled 4 percent of the
number of outstanding mortgage loans. During the years 1937-40, the foreclosure rate
fluctuated only slightly from a level equal to about one-half of the peak of 1935. In
contrast, the foreclosure rate on HOLC loans increased sharply through 1938 (the peak
year) and then began a steady decline. (See John Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the
Savings and Mortgage Markets, Harvard University, 1948, Tables 32 and 33, pp. 272
and 275.)FORECLOSURES 73
closures exceeded 5,000. This peak in foreclosure activity occurred
one-quarter of a year before the trough of the business cycle, June
1938. However, the period of heaviest foreclosures (May 1937 to
July 1938) coincides with the period of cyclical business contraction
as established by Wesley C. Mitchell in Measuring Business Cycles.
By December 1937, eighteen months after finishing its original lend-
ing, the HOLC had made half of all the foreclosures which it was to
make, and three-fourths by June 1939.
The downswing in foreclosures which became evident in the
sharp decline from June to July 1938 continued at a slower rate dur-
ing the remainder of the fiscal year. In June 1939, the monthly rate
was about 3,400; a year later, June 1940, about 1,500. The rate de-
clined further to 1,000 in June 1941, to 500 in June 1942, and there-
after became negligible.5
Most foreclosed loans were nearly two years in default at the time
of foreclosure; consequently, the majority of loans must have be-
come delinquent not more than two years after they had been made.
Assuming that the delinquency on early foreclosures was roughly
equal to the average delinquency for all HOLC experience, half of
the loans eventually foreclosed were delinquent by early 1936 and
a third or more by early 1935.
A number of factors served to reduce foreclosures in the later
years, aside from the fact that the weakest loans were foreclosed at
an early date. One factor was the income improvement in the late
thirties; also significant were the widespread reduction of monthly
amortization payments beginning in October 1939 (especially for
those having payment difficulties), the 1939 reduction of interest
5 The figures on HOLC property acquisitions by month are:
1936 1937 1938 1939a 1940a 1941a 1942a
January 320 a 3,059 4,709 3,300 1,600 1,600 600
February 450a 3,068 4,365 2,800 1,300 1,340 500
March 600a 4,139 5,013 3,400 1,700 1,300 560
April 670a 3,918 4,894 3,000 1,380 1,200 540
May 960a 4,314 4,739 3,500 1,500 1,100 500
June 1,440 a 4,850 4,825 3,400 1,600 1,000 540
July 1,836 4,511 4,094 2,800 1,700 800 500
August 1,957 4,302 3,931 2,900 1,750 660 380
September 2,536 4,737 3,863 2,600 1,700 700 460
October 3,420 4,557 3,617 2,500 1,700 640 350
November 3,094 4,264 3,549 2,400 1,730 600 320
December 3,343 4,604 3,598 1,800 1,600 600 320
aEstimated.Data made available by the HOLC.74 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
rates on all loans, and the improvement in HOLC loan servicing.
Finally, foreclosures were reduced over what they might otherwise
have been by the fact that borrower equities tended to increase as
real estate prices rose and as the principal amount owed on individ-
ual loans was reduced by amortization payments.
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FORECLOSURES
In New York State, where there were 34,399 foreclosures, over 40
percent of the number of original loans were foreclosed; New Jersey
and Massachusetts had about the same record, these three states ac-
counting for more than one-fourth of all foreclosures (Table 1 9).6
Onlyabout 5 percent of the original loans made in Nevada and Wy-
oming were foreclosed, while in Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, and
West Virginia the rate was about 8 percent. Foreclosure rates in the
South were generally well below the national average—19 percent.
Maryland and Oklahoma rates were somewhat higher. Finally, in
Ohio, where the largest number of loans was made, foreclosures were
13 percent of all loans made—approximately the same as in near-by
Illinois and Indiana.
A comparison of the regional distribution of HOLC foreclosures
with that of twenty-four leading life insurance companies reveals
both similarities and differences. Both the HOLC and the life in-
surance companies experienced highest foreclosure rates in the New
England and Middle Atlantic regions. Both experienced rates well
below average in the Mountain and Pacific regions. HOLC experi-
ence in the East North Central region was relatively favorable, how-
ever, with a foreclosure rate about below the national av-
erage; yet the insurance company foreclosure rate in this region was
more than one-thirçl above the national average. In the West North
Central region, on the other hand, the opposite relationship was
found; HOLC foreclosures were well aboye average, while life in-
surance company foreclosures were only one-third of the national
average. In the other regions—the South generally—the foreclosure
6Asample study indicated that thirty-nine selected Massachusetts mutual savings
banks foreclosed 13.1 percent of all mortgage loans (18.3 percent of the amount loaned)
made on one- to four-family dwellings between 1918 and 1931. Dr. Lintner's study does
not reveal how many of the poorer loans of these institu Lions were transferred to the
HOLC. (JOhn Lintner, cit., Table41, p. 362.) Dr. Lintuer has explained in cor-
respondence with the author that he did not treat as foreclosures distress cases trans-
ferred from the mutual savings banks to the HOLC.FORECLOSURES 75
TABLE19 —FORECLOSURERATES ON ALL ORIGINAL LOANS MADE BY THE















New England 15,41032.3% North Carolina 1,60713.0%
Maine 65619.8 South Carolina 62711.0
New Hampshire 40621.7 Georgia 1,77512.0
Vermont 38224.2 Florida 1,317 9.7
Massachusetts 10,13241.3
Rhode Island 1,44523.6 East South Central 8,10216.8
Connecticut 2,38923.2 Kentucky 1,52416.5
Tennessee 2,20316.0
MiddleAtlantic 5&86933.6 Alabama 3,06218.4




East North Central42,59312.8 Arkansas 1,661 16.1
Ohio 12,40812.6 Louisiana 2,35216.4
Indiana 6,56613.5 Oklahoma 6,05025.3
Illinois 9,05712.9 Texas 7,95017.9
Michigan 7,147 8.8
Wisconsin 7,41522.4 Mountain 4,86611.2
Montana 339 9.2
West North Central25,18923.4 Idaho 415 8.8
Minnesota 2,76513.2 Wyoming 129 5.3
Iowa 2,89414.7 Colorado 1,23210.6
Missouri 6,71327.4 New Mexico 188 7.6
North Dakota 1,20827.4 Arizona 91514.1
South Dakota 1,85930.4 Utah 1,59514.8
Nebraska 3,97429.2 Nevada 53 4.4
Kansas 5,77631.2
South Atlantic 12,05913.8 Pacific 9,02210.9
Delaware 23014.0 Washington 2,61412.2
Maryland 3,45921.7 Oregon 916 9.7
Dist. of Columbia 232 11.1 California 5,49210.7
Virginia 2,053 17.1
'West Virginia 759 8.4 United States ci 194,13419.1%
a Data made available by the HOLC.
b Based on the number of properties (securing original loans) acquired by the HOLC.
c Represents the total number of properties (securing original loans) acquired by
the HOLC as a percentage of all original loans made.
d Includes eleven properties acquired in Puerto Rico.76 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
experience of both the HOLC and the life insurance companies was
roughly similar.7
Regional and state differences in foreclosure rates may be due to
some extent to interstate differences in the quality of HOLC loan-
servicing facilities, but also in large part to differences in economic
conditions, in regional and state policies in granting favorable terms
on loan extensions, and in general standards of strictness toward bor-
rowers. Officials of the HOLC have acknowledged that differences in
strictness did exist and that these might have been important in view
of the possibility that leniency in the late thirties may have given
some borrowers an opportunity to meet their obligations with the
later, unforeseen rise in income.
The available data (Table 5 and Table 19) indicate little if any
relation between the foreclosure rate in a given state and the state's
average ratio of the original amount of the loan to the HOLC ap-
praisal. Connecticut and Massachusetts, Minnesota and Nebraska,
Iowa and Kansas, California and New York, and many other pairs
of states can be found where the original loan-to-appraisal rates were
almost identical but where foreclosure rates varied widely. Some con-
trasts may have resulted from real differences in conditions, others
from the fact that the individual items making up identical averages
may have been widely different.
REASONS FOR FORECLOSURE AND NUMBER
OF MONTHS DELINQUENT
In so far as default can seldom be attributed to a single cause, the
available data on the causes of HOLC foreclosures do not lend them-
selves readily to statistical analysis. Despite this limitation, the in-
formation on "reasons for foreclosure," given in Table 20 for loans
foreclosed through June 30, 1944, and based on the reports of HOLC
'analysts in making recommendations for foreclosure, may be of in-
terest. In each case of foreclosure the agent was required to indicate
which of six reasons, presumably the dominant reason, would apply.
The HOLC attributed nearly half its foreclosures to nonco-
operation of borrpwer, although one cannot distinguish in all cases
between this group and the two others of next greatest ih'iportance,'
7R.J. Saulnier, op. cit., Table 25, p. 87. The data are for a sample of urban mort-
gage loans made on one- to four-family dwellings by twenty-four leading life insurance
companies during the years 1920-29. Loans transferred to the HOLC by these life in-
surance companies are not classed as foreclosed.FORECLOSURES 77
namely, obstinate refusal to pay and total inability to pay. A bor-
rower classed as "noncooperative" had, in the opinion of the HOLC
agent, some chance of either carrying the loan or selling the property
with some salvage of equity, but lacked the determination to make
the necessary efforts and sacrifices. Frequently, he rejected the service
representative's suggestions, such as to rent or sell the house, to take
in roomers, to economize, to take work himself or induce a family
member to take work, or to make some other adjustment. In other
cases he might accept the service representative's recommendation
but fail to carry it out; sometimes the HOLC's communications were
entirely ignored.
This type of noncooperation could sometimes be attributed to
a desire to obtain free housing for a time, an object that, in view of
the HOLC's nature, was not difficult to realize, but it was in some
cases due to family difficulties or to the fact that themortgagè was no
longer assumed by the original borrower. More than a third of the
noncooperative cases were in default two years or more and almost
two-thirds for eighteen months or more (Table 20). These arrearages
extended over longer periods than the average delinquency period
for all foreclosures and testify to the patience of the HOLC, or con-
ceivably, to some lack of acumen in loan servicing and to a possible
lack of adequate staff.
The most significant fact revealed by the data on noncooperative
borrowers is that in these 88,166 cases—44.7 percent of all foreclosures
—the HOLC analyst handling the case felt that foreclosure might
have been avoided, at least temporarily, by the borrower. As noted
earlier, borrowers would generally have been better off had they
held on, but in some cases, especially where there was an appreciable
negative equity, it may have been even more profitable for the bor-
rower to exploit the leniency of the HOLC and to get free occupancy
for two years or more. In any event, the figures strongly suggest that
the moralrisk is highly important in determining the outcome of
mortgage credit extensions.
The HOLC found obstinate refusal to pay the second most im-
portant reason for foreclosure. The chief differences between cases in
this category and in that of "noncooperation" seem to have been a
lesser degree of willingness to formulate and carry out plans, and
some evidence that the obstinate borrowers had more resources than














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ers were the worst moral risks. A total of 42,422 foreclosures—2 1.5 per-
cent of the total—was classified as resulting from obstinacy, and over
half of these were delinquent eighteen months or longer (Table 20).
Third in importance as a reason for foreclosure was total inability
to pay—accounting for 17.8 percent of all foreclosures. It is a matter
of some interest that out of more than a million mortgage loans to
borrowers in financial distress, only 2.5 percent were foreclosed for
this cause. Yet it would be easy to conclude too much from such fig-
ures. Some of the abandonment, noncooperation, and obstinacy cases
doubtless involved a complete inability to pay. Moreover, some bor-
rowers who were totally unable to pay avoided foreclosure by selling
their properties. Also, if incomes and prices of houses had not risen
in the forties, the number of foreclosures resulting from inability to
pay might have been much higher.
Nearly one out of every nine foreclosures, 21,468 in all, followed
abandonment of property. This may have been due to the bor-
rower's having found employment in, or having other valid cause to
move to, another community, to a gradual deterioration which made
the property uninhabitable from the borrower's viewpoint, to serious
damage by fire or the elements, to family dissolutions, such as di-
vorce, or to any one or more of numerous other causes. In half of the
abandonment cases the borrower was eighteen months or more in
arrears, and in over three-fourths of them the arrearage was a year or
more (Table 20). As a rule, maintenance in these cases had been ex-
tremely inadequate, meaning substantial loss for the HOLC.
Abandonment as a reason for foreclosure was substantially below
the national average in the East North Central region (7.0 percent),.
and well above the national average in the Mountain (18.0 percent)
and Pacific (18.2 percent) regions (Table 21). In New York, where
foreclosure rates were relatively high, abandonments accounted for
7 percent of all foreclosures; in Massachusetts the rate was almost 19
percent, while in Oregon it was 26 percent.
Finally, death of borrower was assigned as. the reason for over
4 percent of all foreclosures and legal complications for 0.3 percent.
In the death cases the heirs sometimes had no desire to keep the
property for their own occupancy and permitted foreclosure where
there was little or no equity. In three out of four cases the delin-
quency was a year or more, but often this had been accumulated






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The number of months that loans had been delinquent over the
whole life of the loan when the property was recommended for fore-
closure by the HOLC agent is also shown in Table 20.8 In 30 per-
cent of the cases the borrower had been delinquent two years or more
and in over half of them for a year and a half or more; in 6 percent of
the cases delinquency was less than half a year.9 However, since de-
linquent accounts which had been formally extended are not covered
in these calculations, the total period of delinquency was often much
greater than shown.'° Regional variations warrant brief mention. In
the Middle Atlantic region about 60 percent of all cases were eighteen
months or more delinquent, while in the West South Central region
only 45 percent were delinquent for a similar period."
THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
In some states foreclosure is a relatively simple legal process which
can be completed without great expense or delay; in others it is both
8 A special HOLC study of 71,000 original loans authorized for foreclosure from
July 1938 to March 1941—36 percent of all foreclosures—shows that of loans foreclosed
from July 1938 to January 1940 the monthly average of number of months in arrears
was eighteen for the United States total and twenty for the New York region. Beginning
with July 1940, these data are available for extended and nonextended loans Sep.
arately and show that the number of months in arrears was very much greater—about
four to six times—for the nonextended than for the extended loans. For the former,
foreclosures in the New York region from July 1940 to April 1941 averaged about
thirty-four months in arrears. This fact may explain in part the heavy loss record
on New York region loans, but beyond that it is a dramatic evidence of the extent of
the HOLC's indulgence of its borrowers prior to foreclosure.
9 The loan experience of Massachusetts mutual savings banks revealed similar in-
tervals of delinquency, although the banks generally foreclosed somewhat sooner
than the HOLC. For instance, from a sample of loans on one- to four.family dwellings
originally made by thirty-nine selected Massachusetts mutual savings banks during the
years 1918-31 and first foreclosed during 1931-43, the delinquency period of foreclosed
loans was six months or less in 39 percent of all cases, six months to one year in 22 per-
cent of all cases, one to twO years in 23 percent of all cases, and over two years in 16
percent of all cases. See John Lintner,cit., Tables 60 and XIV-4l, pp. 432 and 543;
these data do not include as foreclosures distress cases transferred from the mutual
savings banks to the HOLC.
10 It is estimated that nearly half, and possibly more, of the cases foreclosed had
received some formal extension. If such time were added to the periods used in Table
20, the number of cases less than twelve months delinquent would probably be halved•
while the number delinquent for more than twenty-three months would be nearly
doubled.
11 Based on an unpublished study by the HOLC. The tabulations also illustrate
something of the flexibility of HOLC policy. In every state there were some cases in
which delinquency was slight (unless one makes the improbable assumption that all
cases with short delinquency had received long extensions), while there were many
more with delinquency of two years or more. Such variations testify to the HOLC's ef-
forts to deal with each case on its own apparent merits.82 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
expensive and time-consuming. Thes& differences, as well as the nu-
merous state moratoria of the early thirties, were obviously of great
practical importance to the HOLC, with its huge volume of fore-
closures. Wherever possible the HOLC obtained a voluntary transfer
of title; this was accomplished in 18 percent of all cases: in 39 percent
of the abandonment cases, 28 percent of the total-inability-to-pay
cases, 13 percent of the obstinate-refusal-to-pay cases, and in 11 per-
cent of the noncooperation cases (Table 20). In some states, volun-
tary transfer of title by deed in lieu of foreclosure accounted for less
than 2 percent of all property acquisitions, whereas in others over
40 percent were acquired in this way. In New Jersey nearly one-half,
and in New York about one-fourth, of all acquisitions were by this
method.
SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING EARLY POSSESSION12
It was the practice of the HOLC, in states where such procedure was
legally permissible and its employment seemed advantageous, to
place properties in process of acquisition on an income-producing
basis at the earliest possible time; thus, in states such as Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, the HOLC resorted to the process-of taking posses-
sion of properties as a mortgagee in possession during the period of
acquisition proceedings. Obtaining such possession was initiated at
the time each individual case was received in the Legal Department,
the actual mechanics of the operation being carried out in most in-
stances by fee representatives or salaried personnel. The net result of
this activity was that occupants of properties in process of acquisition,
whether such occupants were owners or tenants, would either be
placed on a tenancy basis acceptable to the Corporation or be evicted.
Such evictions generally arose either from the failure of persons in
possession to agree to the Corporation as landlord or to pay the
Corporation the reasonable rental value 'of the portion of the prem-
ises occupied by such persons. Very frequently, in the case of tenants,
the Corporation accepted as such rental figure the rent being col-
lected by the owner of the property. Many millions of dollars were
collected as the result of this activity. In many areas this was a novel
procedure at the time.
In other areas where legally permissible, the Corporation resorted
to the appointment of receivers, a practice followed successfully in
12 The following material was prepared by the Legal Department of the HOLC.FORECLOSURES 83
New York and Illinois and in some other areas. Receivers were ap-
pointed under court order and served under that authority. The
Corporation received the benefits of income derived from the prop-
erties during the tenure of the receiver after the deduction of operat-
ing costs, including necessary repairs and maintenance and receivers'
fees. Although this practice generally might not have produced as
much financial benefit to the Corporation as the mortgagee-in-pos-
session procedure, the Corporation, nevertheless, collected substan-
tial sums that would not have been obtained by traditional methods.
AVERAGE COSTS OF FORECLOSURE
When voluntary transfers in lieu of foreclosure were used, costs were
mush less than when foreclosure was necessary (Table 22). The av-
erage cost of all such voluntary transfer cases during the nineteen
months ending June 30, 1939 was about $34, ranging from $46 in
• New Jersey and New York to under $10 in twenty-one states; in most
of the last-mentioned states, however, full-time personnel, whose sal-
aries are not included in the average cost of foreclosure, handled the
legal work.
When the property acquisition resulted from foreclosure, the
HQLC had a strong incentive to press for speedy action. For his part,
the borrower would generally stop all payment of principal and in-
terest and would not keep the property in repair, thus raising the
HOLC's potential loss.13 At one time, the HOLC estimated that each
day of delay in completing foreclosure cost from $2 to $3.14 Table 22
shows that the average length of time required to foreclose varied
from state to state, from as little as less than one month to slightly
over two years.15
13 In some cases the HOLC decision to foreclose stimulated the borrower to greater
effort. In the four fiscal years ending June 30, 1941, for example, 21 percent of all fore-
closure actions started were withdrawn before completion.
14 U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations on H.R. 8837: Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1939, 75th
Congress, 3rd Session (1938) p. 15. For properties on which the lOan was less than, say,
$3,000, an average daily cost of delay of $2 seems high. Assuming that the HOLC paid
2½ percent for its funds, that the annual tax and insurance costs came to 3 percent of the
value of the property ($4,500), and that depreciation was 3 percent a year, annual costs
would be about $345, less than $1 a day. The costs of foreclosure action itself were gen.
erally not such as to increase proportionately with the increase in time. The time re-
quired was only one of several factors accounting for differences in foreclosure costs.
15 The data include the redemption periods; in Alabama, however, the HOLC made
a practice of selling foreclosed properties subject to redemptions.84 S. HISTORYAND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 22 —AVERAGECOST OF ACQUIRING PROPERTIES THROUGH FoRE-
CLOSURE AND VOLUNTARY TRANSFER OF DEED IN LIEU OF
FORECLOSURE, AND AVERAGE TIME REQUIRED TO COMPLETE
FORECLOSURE ON ORIGINAL LOANS MADE BY THE HOLC,








Cost Time of Loans Cost
New England
Maine $2L29 12.0 mos. 27 $7.00 d
New Hampshire 77.09 J .2 84 7.63 d
Vermont 107.52 12.5 68 7.63 ci
Massachusetts 32.92 d .9 1,116 7.00 ci
Rhode Island 42.44 ci 1.7
Connecticut 114.20 5.4 182 24.49
Middle Atlantic
New York 280.94 3.8 4,596 46.04
New Jersey 237.90 5.8 4,687 45.79
Pennsylvania 132.52 2.6 10 6.60 d
East North Central
Ohio 129.66 4.7 10 5.42 d
Indiana 186.19 14.0 841 6.21 ci
Illinois 349.59 19.4 2,027
Michigan 86.46 14.9 204 10.01
Wisconsin 165.16 16.8 898 29.23
West North Central
Minnesota 96.79 1S.7 77 14.76
Iowa 123.08 15.8 616 16.80
Missouri 54.08 1.5 304 25.91
North Dakota 104.53 16.0 112 21.45
South Dakota 79.53 13.4 273 21.84
Nebraska 107.90 12.7 719 15.73
Kansas 92.95 13.8 522 15.73
South Atlantic
Delaware 137.37 4.8 8 6.4411
Maryland 151.63 2.2 240 44.46
Dist. of Columbia 51.52 ' 2.7
Virginia 87.53 .8
West Virginia 57.12 1.1
North Carolina 57.42 1.4 5 7.26(1
South Carolina 132.01 3.3 192 21.47
Georgia 54.44 .9 12 7.92
Florida 160.40 3.9 197 40.83


































West South Central .
Arkansas 123.29 5.1 545 30.46
Louisiana 128.08 2.8 325 38.90
Oklahoma 159.35 11.2 . 1,388 4.661
Texas 3.82 d .8 373 5.28 d
Mountain


























Utah 158.46 . 9.1 691 6.24 ci

















a SeventhAnnual Report, Federal Home Loan Bank Board (June 30, 1939) Exhibits
51 and 52, PP. 217-19.
bBasedon a sample of 100 cases in each state. Total costs include attorney fees of
cases handled by fee attorneys only. Therefore, in eight states where both salaried and
fee attorneys were employed (Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Vermont) figures shown may overestimate the true values.
cBasedon properties acquired from December 1, 1937, to June 30, 1939. Total costs
include attorney fees, revenue stamps and recording fees.
a All cases serviced by attorneys. Therefore, total costs exclude attorney fees.
Costs of the foreclosure -process also varied from state to state
(Table 22). Legal fees represented the largest single cost in fore-
closure cases. Except in an insignificant number of cases, the HOLC
practice was to retain local attorneys on a fee basis.'6 Other items of
16 The HOLC kept itself informed on cases that had been assigned to local attorneys
in order to avoid needless delay and cost. After a large number of foreclosure cases be-
gan to arise, the HOLC studied the amount and type of legal work needed in each state
and announced a schedule of lower fees, which it would pay.86 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
cost included court costs, advertising, and stamp taxes. The data in
Table 22 do not include overhead and supervisory costs, the last of
which amounted to about $4 a case, according to an estimate made in
1938, nor do they include the salaries of full-time attorneys.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
Under the laws of many states the HOLC had the right to try to ob-
tain enough from a borrower's other assets to offset the loss resulting
from foreclosure. By exercising' such rights, the HOLC could un-
doubtedly have reduced its losses, yet it deliberately refrained from
doing so except in most unusual cases. The exceptions arose when
the HOLC felt certain that the borrower was able to meet his obli-
gation and was trying to abuse the Corporation's leniency. In such
cases a deficiency judgment was taken and enforced. In other cases
a deficiency judgment was taken to protect the HOLC's interest un-
der state law, but the claim was not pressed. Through October 1939,
approximately 165,000 properties had been foreclosed and a total
of 24,566 deficiency judgments, totaling $34 million, had been ob-
tained. Of this amount $26 million had already been written off,
less than $2 million had. been collected, andthe balance was still un-
settled.17 Through March 31, 1951, total collections of deficiency
judgments were slightly over $2.6 million—57 percent of these being
in Illinois.
FACTORS AFFECTING HOLC FORECLOSURE
•
EXPERIENCE
Because the available HOLC loan experience records were not di-
rectly useful for a study of the factors influencing the quality of the
Corporation's mortgage loans, it was necessary to develop primary
loan experience records through the selection of a sample of loans
from the HOLC files.'8 In this sample, which was drawn by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research from loans made in the original
New York region consisting of Connecticut, New Jersey and New
York, there were 3,883 usable cases, of which 38.6 percent were still
in an active status in the summer of 1947 when the sample was Se-
17 U. S. Congress, House, Hearings before the Subcommittee of .the Committee on
Appropriations on the Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1941, 76th Congress,
3rd Session (1940) pp. 1155, 1220-21.
18 This is the same sample of loans used in Chapter 4 to describe- certain character-
istics of BOLC borrowers and of the properties securing their loans.FORECLOSURES 87
lected and of which 25.7 percent had been paid off and 35.7 percent
had been foreclosed.
The distinction between active, paid-off, and foreclosed loans is
not, however, altogether satisfactory for purposes of a study of loan
quality. While foreclosed loans are obviously of low quality, active
loans are not necessarily of highest quality and some paid-off loans
may, in fact, have been extinguished through sale of the property or
through a fortuitous turn of events that could not be depended on
regularly.'9 Notwithstanding these qualifications, which are present
to some degree in every study of loan experience, the analysis of the
sample data throws many interesting lights on the factors affecting
mortgage loan experience.
In the following sections this sample of loans is analyzed to de-
termine which characteristics of the HOLC borrowers, of the prop-
their loans, or of the mortgage contracts which
they entered seem to have been consistently related with either rela-
tively good or relatively bad foreclosure experience. This is meas-
ured by comparing .the percentage of loans of each type foreclosed
with the average foreclosure rate for all loans.
BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS
It is perhaps to be expected that the income of the mortgage debtor,
at least relative to the burden of his mortgage debt, would prove to
be a significant, if not the most important, factor affecting mortgage
loan experience. Yet it is not a simple matter to determine conclu-
sively whether this is the case. In the first place, such a test would
require data on the borrower's income over the whole period of the
loan's history inasmuch as it is, presumably, a deterioration of income
status rather than the income class of the borrower at the time a loan
is made that leads to delinquency and eventual foreclosure. Further-
more, it is not likely to be income alone, but income in relation to
the amount and terms of the loan—and numerous other factors—that
influences mortgage experience. Whatever other difficulties compli-
19Itshould be observed that some of the loans foreclosed by the HOLC might not
have gone to default during less difficult economic conditions, and, in this respect, the
HOLC experience must be qualified as a guide to future experience. Almost all of the
HOLC loans, of course, were made because of distress. Though not the very worst of
distress cases, loans, nevertheless, were below average, not representative of all the coun-
try's mortgage loans. The analysis of one factor at a time may sometimes be misleading.
The nature of the data, however, did not seem to warrant the effort needed for more
complicated statistical88 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
cate the study of the relation of income to loan experience, the fact
is that the only income data from the HOLC records re-
fer to the family income of the borrower at the time the loan was
granted. Though these data are far from ideal, they are by no means
without interest and are presented in Table 23, with the borrowers
in the several income classes further classified according to the orig-
inal amount of the loan, the monthly rental value of the property,
and the number of the borrower's dependents.
These materials point to the conclusion that it is not possible
to distinguish, on the basis of income alone, between good and bad
loans; the foreclosure rates for each income class were about the
same (Table 23). On the other hand, it appears to have been true of
HOLC experience that, for any given income level of mortgagors,
the percentage of loans eventually foreclosed rose with increases in
loan size. In other words, it is income relative to the amouiit bor-
rowed that appears to be a significant consideration.
It will also be noted that, for any given level of borrower income,
foreclosure rates were higher for those loans secured by properties
having relatively high rentals than for those secured by more mod-
est properties (Table 23). This would appear to be evidence of the
added risk that is assumed in the real estate credit market in cases of
"over-housing" (where the value or cost of the dwelling is higher
than the family's economic position justifies), or perhaps, as we shall
see more directly in other connections, evidence of the greater risk
associated with large loans than with those of small and medium size.
Finally, regarding the number of the borrower's dependents, it
would appear that in the lower income groups a large family rather
than being associated with relatively high foreclosure rates is asso-
ciated with a somewhat better-than-average experience, which per-
haps means that the large family is able to achieve a more stable
income over the life of its loan or attaches greater importance to
avoiding foreclosure; for the higher income groups, on the other
hand, the benefits in this respect of a larger family would seem to
be somewhat more dubious (Table 23).
A final personal characteristic that appears to be important in
the determination of loan quality is the age of the mortgagor. As
will be observed in Table 24, the best HOLC experience in the New
York region was with borrowers in the middle-age groups—thirty-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.90 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
TABLE 24 —FORECLOSURERATES FOR A SAMPLE OF HOLC LOANS MADE






























Total b 3,883 36%
a National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey. Foreclosure rate equals the
number of original loans eventually foreclosed as a percentage of all loans made.
bNumberdoes not add to the total due to omission of loans with inadequate data.
those over fifty-five years of age, having a distinctly worse-than-aver-
age record of experience.
TYPE AND CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY
SECURING THE MORTGAGE LOAN
The record of foreclosure experience on the sample of HOLC loans
made in the original New York region reveals no marked differences
in experience ondifferent broad types of property (Table 25). It is
perhaps, worthy of notice, however, that those structures devoted at
least in part to business use had a somewhat higher foreclosure rate
than the structures having no business use. Furthermore, it will be
observed in Table 25 that there was a tendency for structures of
relatively low value to have a better foreclosure record, regardless of
the broad type of property concerned, than those of high value at
the time the loan was made. Supporting this general conclusion
are the data in this same table showing that the structures with the
smaller number of rooms had, in general, a better foreclosure ex-
perience than the structures with more numerous rooms and the
evidence in Table 23 that structures with low monthly rental values
had a better foreclosure record than those with higher rental values.
There seems to be no clear evidence, however, that size of the corn-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.92 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
It is interesting, also, to note the relationship between foreclosure
rates and the character of the heating and bathing facilities in the
dwellings securing the loans. The facts, as shown in Table 26, sug-
gest that foreclosure experience was least satisfactory on those prop-
erties which had the most up-to-date and adequate heating and bath-
ing facilities, doubtless the same properties, in general, that had a
TABLE 26 —FORECLOSURERATES FOR A SAMPLE OF HOLC LOANS MADE














Fewer baths than families 113 33
Same number of baths as families
More baths than families













Fewer baths than families 60 38
Same number of baths as families 287 27
More baths than families 6 33
Number of baths unknown 1 0
Total b 3,883 36%
a National Bureau of Economic Research sample survey. Foreclosure rate equals the
number of original loans eventually foreclosed as a percentage of all loans made.
b Number does not add to the total due to omission of loans with inadequate data.
high final HOLC review appraisal, a high "normal" monthly rental,
and a relatively large loan. This would seem to suggest that there
was a real tendency for the HOLC to over-loan on the better prop-
erties.20
Some rehttion might be expected between foreclosure experi-
ence and the balance between the value of the land and the value of
the improvements. In order to test this possible relation, the HOLC
20 Other possible explanations are that the HOLC was less lenient in delaying fore-
closures on the higher-priced properties, that their sale to escape foreclosure was
more difficult than the sale of more modest properties, or that economic recovery was
slower and less complete for this group of borrowers than for t.hose with less expensive
properties.FORECLOSURES 93
sample loans have been classified in Table 27 according to the ratio of
what the HOLC termed the "justified land value" to the reproduc-
tion cost of the structure. It will be noted that there is a fairly clear
tendency for foreclosure rates to rise as land values become more im-
portant relative to the depreciated value of the structure, suggesting
that this balance is a matter of importance in governing loan ex-
perience.
TABLE 27 —FORECLOSURERATES FOR A SAMPLE OF HOLC LOANS MADE
IN THE NEW YORK REGION, BY RATIO OF LAND VALUE TO
REPRODUCTION COST a
,












100 andover 200 41
Total C 3,883 36%
a NationalBureau of Economic Research sample survey. Foreclosure rate equals the
number of original loans eventually foreclosed as a percentage of all loans made.
b For a definition ofland value, reproduction cost, and depreciation, see Table 17,
footnotes b and c.
cNumberdoes not add to the total due to omission of loans with inadequate data.
Additional data are given in Table 28 bearing on the relationship
betweenforeclosure experience and the quality ofthe structure be-
ing financed. The HOLC sample loans have been classified according
to the age of the house and certain other pertinent characteristics.
It will be noted, first of all, that the age of the house, alone, seems to
have no clear and consistent relation to foreclosure experience. This
is true regardless of the size of the community, and the character and
status of the district in which the property was located. Also, the de-
gree of depreciation of the house had little relation to foreclosure cx-
These facts suggest further that experience may be deter-
mined more by the weight of the financial burden borne by the
mortgagor and the strength of his determination to prevent fore-
closure than by the character and quality of the collateral.94 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
AMOUNT OF LOAN AND FINANCIAL
BURDEN OF MORTGAGE
It remains to examine further into the relationship between fore-
closure experience, as evidenced by this sample of HOLC loans in
the New York region, and such measures as are available ofthefi-
nancial burden involved in the mortgage contract. Data bearing on
this matter are presented in Tables 29 and 30. In Table 29 the loans
are classified according to their original amount and then subclassi-
fled according to the type of property involved and its "normal"
monthly rental value. For each of the five original loan amount cate-
gories, the foreclosure rate has a steady tendency to fall the higher
the "normal" monthly rental value. Yet for the total of the com-
bined five loan amount categories, just the opposite is true: the fore-
closure rate has a steady tendency to rise the higher the "normal"
monthly rental value. This apparent inconsistency results from dif-
ferences in weighting. It would appear, first of all, that the HOLC
experience was distinctly less satisfactory on loans of large amount
than on those of small amount.2' This was certainly true of loans on
single-family houses with no business use and also on one- to four-
family houses with business use, which are the two largest classes of
properties. There is some evidence that it was also true for two-family
21Datafor all HOLC loans confirm this general conclusion. In its owntabulation
of all foreclosures the HOLC found that foreclosure rates ran highest on the large
loans. Whereas 12.6 percent of all loans were for $1,000 or less, only 6.8 percent of all
foreclosures came from this group; 1,4 percent oforiginal loans were for over $10,000,
but 3.6 percent of all foreclosures fell in this group. Of the original loans, 18.9 percent
were from $5,000 to $10,000, but 24.6 percent of the foreclosures were in this group.
Nearly half of all foreclosures were on properties on which the original loan was from
$2,000 to. $5,000; 47.0 percent 'of all loans were on properties in these groups. Fore-
closure rates on a sample.of urban mortgage loans made on one- to four-family dwell-
ings by twenty.four leading life insurance companies, 1920-29, indicate that life insur-
ance companies also experienced substantially higher—roughly, double—foreclosure
rates on loans for more than $5,000 than on loans for less than that amount. (R. J.
Saulnier, op. cit., Table 26, p. 89.)
The experience of a samplc of thirty-nine Massachusetts mutual savings banks on
loans made during the period 1918-31 was also closely parallel: The foreclosure rate
on loans under $2,000 secured by single-family dwellings was 3.8 percent; on loans over
$15,000, 26.5 percent. Of the loans under $2,000 secured by two-family dwellings, 6.S
percent were foreclosed compared with 46.2 percent of those over $10,000. Of the loans
under $5,000 made during the period 1918-30, secured by three- and four-family dwell-
ings, 8.7 percent were foreclosed; on loans over $10,000, the foreclOsure rate was 36.5
percent. (John Lintner,cit., Tables 45, XIV-4 and XIV-8, pp. 392, 516, and 520,
respectively; the data do not include as foreclosures distress cases transferred from the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.96 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE
houses,but in the case of three- and structures the num-
ber of loans involved was too small to yield conclusive results one
way or the other. In any event, it is reasonably clear that, all things
considered, there was a tendency for relatively more large loans to
go to foreclosure than for loans of small original amount.
Owing to the operating policies of the I-IOLC, there was a dis-
tinct and consistent relationship among the amount of loan, the ap-
praised value of the property, and the property's "normal" monthly
rental value. The relationship between loan amount and appraised
value results from the fact that in the., great majority of cases loans
were made• in an original amount that was close to the maximum
permissible loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent. The relationship be-
tween the appraised value of a property and. its "normal" monthly
rental value was due, in part, to the fact that the latter was used
as a basis for determining the former. Accordingly, the relationship
which was found between foreclosure rates and the original loan
amount, namely, a tendency for foreclosure rates to rise with loan
amount, would be expected to prevail as between foreclosure rates
and both appraised values and "normal" monthly rental values.Table
29 shows that foreclosure rates were higher on those properties hav-
ing high "normal" monthly rental values than on those with low
rental values, but this table also reveals that for any given size class of
loans foreclosure rates were lowest on those properties having the
highest rental values.
Additional data in Table 30 bear fairly directly on the question
of the relation of financial burden to HOLC mortgage loan experi-
ence. It is not easy to measure burden in this respect since it is ob-
viously dependent on a complex set of facts bearing on the family
budget. However, some light is thrown on the problem by consider-
ing the original amount of the loan relative to the loan-to-value ratio
(based on the final HOLC review appraisal) and to the extent of the
owner's equity in the property when the loan was made. The owner's
equity, a rough estimate at best, was computed by subtracting the
debts due on the property from the estimated market price at the
time of appraisal. Referring to the first of these, it will be immedi-
ately apparent that loans made with low loan-to-value ratios were
distinctly better than those made with high loan-to-value ratios. In
general, this was most characteristic of loans made in modest


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to-value 'ratios and these, as has been indicated already, had a com-
paratively unfavorable foreclosure record.
Secondly, it is reasonably in Table 30 that those properties
in which, at the time the loan was made, the borrower had no equity
or a negative equity were of far less-than-average quality in terms of
foreclosure experience. Conversely, those properties. in which the
borrower had a high equity were the properties on which foreclosure
experience was relatively most favorable. Except for the very largest
loans, say those of $8,000 and over, there was a distinct tendency for
this relation to prevail for loans of all sizes: thus, small loans were
better when the owner's equity was high rather than low and this
was true also of medium-sized loans. However, even a relatively high
owner's equity was insufficient, it would appear, to offset the burden
of a large loan.
Finally, it may be observed that the amount due on loans at the
time of foreclosure was, for a significant proportion of the loans, from
10 to 20 percent greater than the original amount loaned, regardless
of the size of the original loan (Table 31). For all of its foreclosed
loans the HOLC found that the amount due at foreclosure was 11
percent greater than the amount originally loaned, due in the main
to the addition to loan balances of unpaid interest and the amounts
of taxes and insurance advanced by the HOLC.
TABLE 31 —PERCENTAGEDISTRIBUTION OF HOLC FORECLOSURES IN THE
NEW YORK REGION, BY ORIGINAL LOAN AMOUNT AND RATIO



























110—119 30 32 35 30 31
120 and over 16 10 10 8 11
Not available 33 38 33 42 37
Total Number C 324 488 282 288 1,388
a NationalBureau of Economic Research sample survey.
bAmountdue at foreclosure.
cExcludessix loans for which original loan amount was not available.100 HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOLC
Though subjective factors, such as the borrower's determination
to avoid foreclosure, are doubtless of great importance, it may be
concluded from this analysis that the principal objective factors gov-
erning mortgage loan experience have to do with the weight of the
financial burden assumed in connection with the mortgage contract.
Income alone or type or condition of the property seem not to have
been determinative considerations, but rather the amount of the
loan relative to the borrower's income and the extent of his equity
in the mortgaged property. Such factors as a high rental value seem
to influence loan experience because loans on high rental properties
were generally large and were made with a relatively high loan-to-
value ratio, and both of these conditions, were associated with rela-
tively poor loan experience. These results are broadly consistent with
the results of other studies of mortgage loan experience; indeed, they
supplement these studies in the emphasis that they place upon the
importance to mortgage experience of a loan contract that is man-
ageable within the income resources of, the mortgagor.